Appeasement Portfolio.
Iran Nukes.
POTUS's remarks about Iran's missile program come in the same month that the US has agreed to unconditional negotiations with Tehran and the IAEA has signaled that Iran is now capable of constructing an atomic bomb. The atomic weapon is designed for the warhead atop the missiles. The reason the Iran missile program is a threat is because Iran is building miniaturized nukes for the warhead that can reach toward Moscow and Athens and Mumbai and Cairo and the number one target, Tel Aviv. In addition, Moscow has now reached an accord to loan Hugo Chavez and Caracas money to buy medium range missiles. Hugo Chavez has just returned from the triumphant tour to Damascus and Tehran, where he made common cause with the tyrant Assad and the usurper Ahmadinejad. I do not need to tally this mischief. The Obama administration's decision to stand down from strategic defense in Europe is an admission of weakness. Will it also be seen as a resignation from the contest against Tehran's nukes? Yes. Will Tehran back off now that the US has drawn in its talons? No. Is NATO safer because there is no answer to rogue arrows? Let NATO decide. America has gone jaw-jaw. The Twelver regime in Tehran has gone war-war.
(1)
Genius diplomacy!
Go to Moscow empty handed and get a tongue lashing.
Moscow cozy's up to Berlin.
Moscow sells missiles to Chavez and kills Monroe Doctrine
Cave in to North Korea (Delayed quid pro quo?)
Cancel Missile Defense on 70th Anniversary of Soviet invasion (Why not when you go to Moscow?)
Next Iran?
Then Afganistan?
Quo vadis?
NOW TAKE THE TROOPS OUT OF GERMANY
Our troops are in Germany to protect it from Russia. But now Russia and Germany are in bed
together. So ....
Is there more to say on this?
Is this what "peace in our time" feels like?
Do I warn my children and grandchildren that war is imminent?
How messed up can this get--how about we are emboldening every possible terror prospect there can be.
I am back to my "bully" analogy--show fear and expect a beating and your lunch money gone. Iran, Venezuela, Russia, Korea...all "bully" run states. AlQ and Taliban, bully run wannabes....God, does anyone have a rational strategic thought in the current administration? Do these young earnest men understand there are people who really, really hate us and want to kill us just because?
Right, just shut up give your lunch money and take your beating like you should, after all no one cares if the stupid kid gets a beating (especially if he has been loud, inconsiderate and needlessly thoughtless--oh, and used to be rich). Doesn't fit the picture you have of the US? Then do something about it, it's how the world sees us. Anon.
I'm throwing down with the belief that the JCoS and the SoD and the Generals are making policy concerning these decisions. It's not the PotUS. He is listening, just as it should be.
What arms deals has the KremWerks negotiated recently that have actually been fulfilled? Not many of any substantial meaning.
Syria wanted KremWerks missile defense. Iran wanted the same system. Chavez wanted a Kalishnikov factory. They all said that a deal had been struck, but, I don't believe any have actually been concluded to delivery.
The boast is now that KremWerks has birthed a financial platform and is going to provide 2 billion in funds for Chavez to buy missiles. The isolationists are trading with each other like at a flea market. Got milk? I got this for you. Got gas? Can you please leave the room to do that!
China wants some Orinoco, but, they are vulnerable to upcoming sanctions which will be imposed on VeneChavez for trade violations.
There is an implied danger we subject ourselves to though. That danger is that we agree to accept their claim that their own desperation and failure is a direct result of our lack of interaction with them, when the truth is, we have tried in earnest to encourage them to be constructive, productive, and contributory to the world of nations.
Is it not a show of strength to express that we are confident that whatever our enemies can muster against is by far insufficient?
Is there not a potential sale of Patriot systems being negotiated between US and Turkey?
I believe there is, yet, deal has yet to be finalized and may involve US financing of approximately 8 Billion...
An iron bull is bothered not by flies.
People like to be scared (roller coasters, horror films/books, extreme sports). This can be extrapolated to what percentage of the need/desire to name enemies and ascribe powers to them?
> The Obama administration's decision to stand down from strategic defense in Europe is an admission of weakness.
Not weakness John. That's the old paradigm. In the new paradigm we've thrown in with the bullies. We've joined the street gang. Any future wars of consequence fought here will be among the gang members themselves. We, as a recent inductees, still have to prove ourselves worthy. How's about giving them Israel? Taiwan? Eastern Europe? Iraq? Afghanistan? Our initiation still lies ahead. How much will be enough to satisfy the bully's perverse appetites?
Why not offer him ourselves as well - neatly disemboweled. The decision has already been taken at the highest levels. The betrayal is underway. The only question remaining is: Will the pace of betrayal be fast enough to outpace our political process?
LOGICAL move by Moscow: product of US hesitation with regard Chavez.
RUSSIA, CUBA: RENEWING MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Summary
Russia will help Cuba modernize its aging military equipment and provide training to the country's military personnel, according to Chief of Russia's General Staff Nikolai Makarov on Sept. 18. Russia has long helped Cuba in military affairs and the latest developments are just another turn in the pattern followed during the Cold War. Although maintaining a military presence in Latin America has logistical and financial problems for Russia, it will still force the United States to address the Russian presence in its regional backyard.
Analysis
The Chief of Russia's General Staff Nikolai Makarov said Sept. 18 that Russia will aid Cuba in the near future in modernizing its Soviet-era military equipment and in training the country's military personnel. This statement comes at the end of Makarov's weeklong visit to Cuba, in which the military leader has been meeting with Cuban President Raul Castro and visiting military facilities to meet with the country's top personnel. Makarov also announced that preparations are under way for Russian warships to visit Cuba soon, although no exact date was given.
These developments in Russian-Cuban military cooperation follow an oft-repeated pattern, which dates back to the Cold War-era relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This pattern has seen visits and military deals between Moscow and various Latin American countries ramped up in the context of power plays between Russia and the United States. In March, Makarov announced that Russia was considering building an air base in either Cuba or Venezuela right before Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama were set to meet on the sidelines of the G-20 summit on April 1. In July 2008, just before the Russo-Georgian war, Russian bombers appeared in Cuba, complete with rumors flying of Moscow reopening the Lourdes base.
The latest power play is represented in the current standoff over Iran's nuclear program, in which the United States has threatened "crippling" sanctions on gasoline imports to get Tehran to come to the table, while Israel is seriously considering taking a military option. On the other side, Russia has myriad tools it can use to help Iran out of its corner, and is using these tools to gain leverage over the United States. In Latin America, these tools range from political and economic support for anti-U.S. states like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.
But while Russian announcements of military deals are nothing new, the realities of serious logistical constraints remain as well. For Moscow, maintaining a significant military presence in Cuba or elsewhere in Latin America is costly in terms of financial and military resources, both of which are not in surplus in Russia, as the Soviets found after decades of buying influence in Latin American satellite states. Also, specifically in Cuba, U.S. forces at the Naval Air Station Key West are only a stone's throw away, making the Russians vulnerable to U.S. intelligence assets in the area.
Another potential option for Russia is using its relationship with countries that are opposed to the United States in order to support ongoing insurgencies in South America (like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) -- a tried-and-true trick from the Cold War. This is a relatively low-cost way of starting fires in the Western Hemisphere that the United States will likely feel obliged to help put out.
For its part, the United States has slowly been making its own play for Cuba by lifting restrictions on remittances and travel for Cuban Americans, as well as lifting restrictions on certain types of trade. Though the United States is not yet prepared to lift the embargo (and indeed just renewed it), it has made clear that it is ready to seek a rapprochement (of sorts) with Cuba.
This competition for influence on the Caribbean island is a product of Cuba's critical position between the mouth of the Mississippi River and global trade routes. And while promises of major military cooperation with Cuba may never materialize, for Moscow, Havana will always be a useful point of pressure on Washington -- particularly ahead of presidential meet and greets.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
Stratfor on Czechs and Poland: doesn't sound like good news:
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
THE UNITED STATES on Thursday announced plans to redefine its missile defense system, away from one that would be based in Poland and the Czech Republic -- and which was intended as a global system -- to a phased system, ultimately built around U.S. destroyers based in the Mediterranean and the North Sea and intended primarily to defend Europe. The principle of missile defense remains intact -- the first phases are to be deployed more quickly than in the earlier plan -- but the basing in Central Europe is gone.
This has generated a crisis of confidence in Central Europe -- particularly in the Czech Republic and Poland, which see the decision as an abandonment of the U.S. commitment to the region. The Poles and others are obviously aware that the presence of missiles and radar on their soil does nothing to increase their national security, but they saw the weapons as a practical commitment to their defense. With the missile systems located there, the thinking went, the United States would regard Poland and the Czech Republic as critical to American national security, and that it therefore would defend them against an increasingly assertive Russia. With the defense system redeployed offshore, the American commitment to missile defense is no longer linked to Polish or Czech national defense; hence the feeling of abandonment.
This is particularly the case in the current strategic environment. Talks with Iran -- against which the missile defense system was intended -- begin on Oct. 1. The American plan was to impose “crippling” sanctions against Iran if it persists with its nuclear program. The Russians made clear that they would oppose any sanctions, thus rendering them ineffectual if implemented. With the Israelis threatening unilateral action if sanctions were not imposed, the United States needed Russian support. Russia saw the missile shield, in Poland particularly, the same way the Poles did -- as a bilateral U.S. commitment to Polish defense -- and the Russians wanted the missiles out. Therefore the Poles saw the American decision as a capitulation to the Russians in hopes that it would cause the Russians to reciprocate on Iran.
"In other words, the Russians have already paid for the missile shield, and the price for collaboration on Iran would be much higher."
For their part, the Russians quickly announced that while they saw Washington’s decision as a positive step, they had already made concessions to the United States by opening a supply route through Russia and the former Soviet Union to Afghanistan. In other words, the Russians have already paid for the missile shield, and the price for collaboration on Iran would be much higher. This has been the consistent Russian position and is no surprise. Still, we assume -- based on Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s statements -- that this move opens the door for bargaining with the Russians over Iran sanctions. That by itself would place pressure on Iran.
The Czechs and Poles clearly knew that this decision was coming, but the timing surprised them. Indeed, the timing seems to have surprised the Obama administration, which spent the early morning hours in Washington scrambling to notify Prague and Warsaw of the decision. There were reports in Washington that though the decision had been made, the rushed notification was triggered by a news leak before the diplomatic proprieties had been completed. There was a lot of scrambling, and the timing made it appear to the Central Europeans that the Americans were bargaining away their interests in the hopes of enticing the Russians over Iran -- making their reaction even worse, without coming near to enticing the Russians.
In the end, BMD is a symbolic rather than meaningful issue to the defense of Central Europe. The delivery of 48 F-16s with advanced systems to Poland is enormously more important to Polish defense than the BMD was. The defense of Poland is a matter of conventional forces under any circumstances. The Russians are demanding recognition of their sphere of influence in the former Soviet region, but this is something the United States continues to reject. Therefore, the Russian dream of a neutral Poland is a fantasy. In some ways, the withdrawal of the BMD plan gives Poland and other countries in the region far more leverage with Washington for the transfer of weapons and training. The clumsy manner in which the announcement was made opens Washington up to demands from the region for other, more real and less symbolic, offers.
If the BMD announcement is a peace offering to the Russians, it is insufficient in itself to entice them. Iran as a thorn in the American side is worth far more to the Russians than what the United States has given them so far. As a practical matter, the decision has no effect on Polish or Czech security, but actually gives these states greater leverage with Washington. Therefore, as a strategic move, the decision has limited significance. It may well be a rational move from a technological standpoint, if the new system is indeed as effective as it is claimed. But the sheer confusion on Thursday morning raised serious questions about the bureaucratic processes in Washington. It also created more problems than were necessary -- and the decision certainly did not move the Russians, if that was the purpose.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
I can see all those empty gleaming condos in Miami turned into barracks, helipads, and Patriot batteries. Key Biscayne AFB?
Take the SR-71s out of mothballs.
What of Georgia these days? Crippled and twisting in the wind?
Will the Georgia model play out again someplace?
vsk
KremWerks has made it clear that (I'm paraphrasing now)
'Vee mak gud Rushan prodokshons. Ef peepholes vont tu purchos KremVerks prodoks, vee veel surtanle verk a deel... ane deel at oll'
Adam Jasser of the Warsaw based demosEuropa
"The end result will be that the Poles and other central Europeans will be incentivised to see the European Union rather than the United States as the main vehicle for dealing with Russia. … [the cancellation of missile defences] sends to a well-deserved resting place Donald Rumsfeld's concept of the 'old' and 'new' Europe ... [This] may be a win-win for Europe and the United States, which sometimes appeared torn between a desire to see a strong united Europe and a temptation to divide the Europeans and play them against each other. It is clear that the former was and will be the better option for the west."
Understandable now why Obama returned the Churchill bust at the time of Gordon Brown's visit---he would be more comfortable with a set of Stanley Baldwin / Neville Chamberlain bookends. They are more suited to his diplomatic style.
Stratfor on Czechs and Poland: doesn't sound like good news:
CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
THE UNITED STATES on Thursday announced plans to redefine its missile defense system, away from one that would be based in Poland and the Czech Republic -- and which was intended as a global system -- to a phased system, ultimately built around U.S. destroyers based in the Mediterranean and the North Sea and intended primarily to defend Europe. The principle of missile defense remains intact -- the first phases are to be deployed more quickly than in the earlier plan -- but the basing in Central Europe is gone.
This has generated a crisis of confidence in Central Europe -- particularly in the Czech Republic and Poland, which see the decision as an abandonment of the U.S. commitment to the region. The Poles and others are obviously aware that the presence of missiles and radar on their soil does nothing to increase their national security, but they saw the weapons as a practical commitment to their defense. With the missile systems located there, the thinking went, the United States would regard Poland and the Czech Republic as critical to American national security, and that it therefore would defend them against an increasingly assertive Russia. With the defense system redeployed offshore, the American commitment to missile defense is no longer linked to Polish or Czech national defense; hence the feeling of abandonment.
This is particularly the case in the current strategic environment. Talks with Iran -- against which the missile defense system was intended -- begin on Oct. 1. The American plan was to impose “crippling” sanctions against Iran if it persists with its nuclear program. The Russians made clear that they would oppose any sanctions, thus rendering them ineffectual if implemented. With the Israelis threatening unilateral action if sanctions were not imposed, the United States needed Russian support. Russia saw the missile shield, in Poland particularly, the same way the Poles did -- as a bilateral U.S. commitment to Polish defense -- and the Russians wanted the missiles out. Therefore the Poles saw the American decision as a capitulation to the Russians in hopes that it would cause the Russians to reciprocate on Iran.
"In other words, the Russians have already paid for the missile shield, and the price for collaboration on Iran would be much higher."
For their part, the Russians quickly announced that while they saw Washington’s decision as a positive step, they had already made concessions to the United States by opening a supply route through Russia and the former Soviet Union to Afghanistan. In other words, the Russians have already paid for the missile shield, and the price for collaboration on Iran would be much higher. This has been the consistent Russian position and is no surprise. Still, we assume -- based on Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s statements -- that this move opens the door for bargaining with the Russians over Iran sanctions. That by itself would place pressure on Iran.
The Czechs and Poles clearly knew that this decision was coming, but the timing surprised them. Indeed, the timing seems to have surprised the Obama administration, which spent the early morning hours in Washington scrambling to notify Prague and Warsaw of the decision. There were reports in Washington that though the decision had been made, the rushed notification was triggered by a news leak before the diplomatic proprieties had been completed. There was a lot of scrambling, and the timing made it appear to the Central Europeans that the Americans were bargaining away their interests in the hopes of enticing the Russians over Iran -- making their reaction even worse, without coming near to enticing the Russians.
In the end, BMD is a symbolic rather than meaningful issue to the defense of Central Europe. The delivery of 48 F-16s with advanced systems to Poland is enormously more important to Polish defense than the BMD was. The defense of Poland is a matter of conventional forces under any circumstances. The Russians are demanding recognition of their sphere of influence in the former Soviet region, but this is something the United States continues to reject. Therefore, the Russian dream of a neutral Poland is a fantasy. In some ways, the withdrawal of the BMD plan gives Poland and other countries in the region far more leverage with Washington for the transfer of weapons and training. The clumsy manner in which the announcement was made opens Washington up to demands from the region for other, more real and less symbolic, offers.
If the BMD announcement is a peace offering to the Russians, it is insufficient in itself to entice them. Iran as a thorn in the American side is worth far more to the Russians than what the United States has given them so far. As a practical matter, the decision has no effect on Polish or Czech security, but actually gives these states greater leverage with Washington. Therefore, as a strategic move, the decision has limited significance. It may well be a rational move from a technological standpoint, if the new system is indeed as effective as it is claimed. But the sheer confusion on Thursday morning raised serious questions about the bureaucratic processes in Washington. It also created more problems than were necessary -- and the decision certainly did not move the Russians, if that was the purpose.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.